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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

CaseNo.20040925-CA

KENNY LEE DOPORTO,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from convictions of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony,
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class
B misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (2003). This Court has jurisdiction
over the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004) (cases transferred
from Supreme Court).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue is whether the evidence sufficed to show that defendant used or
threatened to use his car as a dangerous weapon in the course of committing a
robbery. The issue is not, as defendant asserts, whether the evidence sufficed to show
that he intended to use his car as a dangerous weapon.
Standard of Review. This Court "will reverse a jury verdict only when, after
viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the
verdict," the Court "find[s] that the evidence to support the verdict was completely

lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable
and unjust." State v. McDonald, 2005 UT App 86, \ 8, 520 Utah Adv. Rep. 7.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with aggravated robbery, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-302 (2003); theft by deception, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-405 (2003); and
unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated § 58-37a-5 (2003). See R53.
After both parties had rested at trial, defendant moved to "dismiss or at least
reduce" the aggravated robbery charge. Defendant conceded that the evidence sufficed to
show the use of force or fear, but asserted that it did not suffice to show the use of a
dangerous weapon. Rl43:112. The trial court denied the motion, stating "there's an
issue of fact for the jury's consideration as to whether or not this defendant used the
vehicle as a dangerous weapon." Id. at 113.
The jury found defendant guilty of aggravated robbery and unlawful possession of
drug paraphernalia. R106, 110. The State dismissed the theft by deception charge after a
witness failed to appear. Rl 11 -13.
The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate prison term of five years to
life on the aggravated robbery conviction and to a concurrent six-month jail term on the
drug paraphernalia conviction. Rl 16-17.
Defendant timely appealed. Rl 19.

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant was on the phone early February 27,2004, "trying to borrow money
because [he] was starting to get sick from [his] drug addiction and [he] was planning how
[he] was going to get [his] drugs that day." Rl43:98. A heroin addict, he was "dope
sick" and "in a hurry." Id. at 99. When he was unable to borrow money, he "drove
around. .. looking for anything [he] could find to steal,... just to get that fix." Id. at
100.
As he was driving, he saw a red truck carrying a compressor. Id. at 100. He
followed the truck to the parking lot of a flooring business. Id. at 101. After the driver
exited, defendant pulled his car close to the truck, left the car running, took the
compressor out of the back of the truck, and threw the compressor on the seat of his car.
Id. at 102.
As it turned out, the red truck belonged to Dylan Cole, who worked as an installer
for his father's flooring business. Id. at 45-46, 51. Dylan carried the air compressor in
his truck and used it for installations. Id. at 47. Dylan had stopped at the business that
morning to load some tools. Id. at 46.
Dylan's father, Eric Cole, was at a computer by a showroom window that morning
while his son was getting the tools. Id. at 53. Looking through the windows, he saw
defendant "reach into the back of [his] son's truck and grab a compressor." Id. at 54. As
defendant carried the compressor to his car, Eric "raced out of the front of the
showroom . . . to where he was parked." Id. He "went up to the front of the car with
[his] hand up saying, Hey, stop, wait a minute." Id. He stood directly infrontof
3

defendant's car, a "couple of inches from the bumper." Id. at 55. He pounded on the
driver's side window. Id. at 72.
Defendant, who was attempting to drive away, looked up and saw Eric. Id. at 55.
He seemed "shocked that [Eric] was standing right there." Id. Defendant stopped, hit the
gas again, and stopped again. Id.; see also id. at 73. Eric, seeing that he would either
have to jump on the hood or be run over, jumped on the hood of defendant's car. Id. at
55-56. He grabbed onto a little ledge "where the wipers go." Id. at 56.
Once Eric was on the hood, defendant did not stop again. Id. at 74. Defendant
accelerated out of the parking lot, drove about 50 feet, and then "did a real quick U-turn
that threw [Eric] off the car." Id. at 56, 61. Eric sustained minor injuries. Id. at 56.
After throwing Eric from the car, defendant "sped off." Id. at 62.
A passer-by saw the incident and followed defendant over twenty blocks. See id.
at 51, 75-76. He saw defendant stop at one pawn shop, return to his car, and drive to a
second pawn shop. Id. at 77. The passer-by telephoned the police while he followed
defendant. Id. at 78, 82. Police met the passer-by and defendant at the second pawn
shop. Id. at 78, 85.
Police officers handcuffed and searched defendant. Id, at 85-86. During the
search they found a needle, a syringe, and a spoon, items that are used together for the
ingestion of narcotics. Id. at 86-87.
Defendant told the officers that he had taken the compressor. Id. at 92. Asked
about the incident with Eric Cole on the hood of his car, defendant said, "I was concerned
about being caught and I needed my fix." Id.
4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
To support defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery, the State had to present
evidence to support a finding that defendant used or threatened to use his car as a
dangerous weapon. The State was not required to show that defendant intended to use his
car as a deadly weapon. Defendant's claim that the State must show such intent is
contrary to the plain language of the relevant statute and to Utah case law.
The State presented evidence sufficient to support a finding that defendant used
his car as a dangerous weapon. Despite seeing Eric Cole inches in front of the car,
defendant accelerated toward him, stopped, and then hit the gas again. When Eric
jumped on the hood to avoid being hit, defendant accelerated out of the parking lot, made
a quick U-turn, and threw Eric off the car. Evidence of this conduct sufficed to show that
defendant used the car in a manner that was capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury. This, in turn, supported a finding that in so using the car, defendant used a deadly
weapon during the course of a robbery.

5

ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE SUFFICED TO SUPPORT A VERDICT THAT
DEFENDANT USED HIS VEHICLE AS A DANGEROUS WEAPON
Defendant claims that "[t]he State failed to present evidence to support that [he]
intended to use his vehicle as a dangerous weapon to sustain a conviction for aggravated
robbery." Br. Appellant at 9. In making his claim, defendant misstates the State's
burden. To prove robbery, the State must show that defendant knowingly or intentionally
used force or fear of immediate force against another in the course of committing a theft.
To prove aggravated robbery, the State must prove additionally that defendant used or
threatened to use a dangerous weapon during the course of that robbery. The State need
not prove that defendant intended to use his vehicle as a dangerous weapon, only that he
did use it as a dangerous weapon.
In making any claim "challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for a jury
verdict," defendant "must overcome a heavy burden." State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App
136, Tf 10, 2 P.3d 954. This Court "will reverse a jury verdict only when, after viewing
the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict,"
the Court "find[s] that the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was
so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust."
McDonald, 2005 UT App 86 at ^f 8 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

6

A.

To prove aggravated robbery, the State was required to show that defendant
used or threatened to use his car as a dangerous weapon, not that he intended
to use it as a dangerous weapon.
Defendant states that "the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that [he] possessed the requisite mental state to commit the offense." Br. Appellant at 12
(citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-501(2)(b) (2003)). Defendant then asserts that "[t]he
mental state required for aggravated robbery is indicated by the inclusion of the word
'use[d] or threatened] to use.'" Id. (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302). Defendant
further asserts that "[t]he terms "use[d] or threatened to use' denote[] that a defendant
must possess an intent to employ an item as a dangerous weapon." Id. Defendant's
claim is contrary to the plain language of the relevant statute and Utah case law.
"A person commits robbery if... the person intentionally or knowingly uses force
or fear of immediate force against another in the course of committing a theft." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (2003). An act is considered to be "'in the course of committing a
theft' if it occurs in .. . commission of theft, or in the immediate flight after
the . . . commission." Id.
"A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing a robbery,
he . . . uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 . . . . "
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (emphasis added). An act is "considered to be 4in the course
of committing a robbery' if it occurs . .. during the commission of, or in the immediate
flight after the . . . commission of a robbery." Id. A dangerous weapon includes "any

Relevant statutes are reproduced in their entirety in Addendum A.
7

item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5)
(2003).
The statute states that a person commits aggravated robbery if "he uses . . . or
threatens to use a dangerous weapon." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. "Use" is a term
describing an act, not a mental state. "Use" means to "put into action or service."
MERRIAM WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY

(version 2.5 CD-ROM 2000).

"Threaten" is also a term that describes an act. "Threaten" means "to utter threats" or
"promise punishment." Id.
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court rejected defendant's argument in a case
interpreting an earlier version of the aggravated robbery statute. See State v. Sunniville,
741 P.2d 961, 962-65 (Utah 1987). The version applicable to Sunniville's crime stated,
in part, that "A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he . . . [u]ses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm." Id. at 962. The issue in the
case was "whether [Sunniville] used a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm while robbing [a
credit union]." Id. at 963. The teller testified that Sunniville's "right hand was inside his
coat pocket which he lifted over the counter." Id. at 962. She stated that while she saw
no gun, the positioning of Sunniville's hand inside the pocket made it look like he had a
gun. Id. Further, Sunniville told her, "This is a robbery, don't turn it into a homicide.
Give me all of your money.'" Id.
The court held that Sunniville had not used a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm.
The court stated, "It is obvious that had the Utah Legislature intended for the subjective
analysis to be used in aggravated robbery cases, it could have written a statute employing
8

language which would admit of that analysis. Instead, the legislature was very precise
and used language that clearly requires the use of a firearm or a facsimile thereof." Id. at
964. Thus, the issue was "not what was intended by [Sunniville] or what impression was
made on the victim, but what was used" Id. (first emphasis added; second in original);
see also Ward v. State, 2002 WL 1724334, at *4 (Tex App. 2002) (not reported in
S.W.3d) (attached in Addendum B) (analyzing a Texas statute requiring use of a deadly
weapon as an element of aggravated robbery and holding that "it was not necessary for
the jury to find that the defendant intended to use [a Ford] Explorer as a deadly weapon";
rather, "it was enough to find the truck was used as a deadly weapon").
The current version of the aggravated robbery statute requires a showing that
defendant "use[d] or threatened] to use a dangerous weapon." "When a court interprets
an amendment '[t]he legislature is presumed to know the prior construction of terms in
the original act.5" State v. Westerman, 945 P.2d 695, 698 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting 1A
Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 22.30, at 266-67 (5th ed. 1993)).
Thus, the legislature is presumed to have known that the Utah Supreme Court had

9

interpreted the term "use" to mean an act, not a state of mind, and that it intended that
meaning when it again employed the term "use" in the current version.
Thus, the issue for this Court is not whether the evidence supported a jury verdict
that defendant intended to use his car as a dangerous weapon. Rather, the issue is
whether the evidence supported a jury verdict that defendant did in fact use his car as a
dangerous weapon.3
B.

Defendant used his car as a dangerous weapon.
A dangerous weapon includes "any item capable of causing death or serious

bodily injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5). The State has located no Utah authority
addressing the use of an automobile as a dangerous weapon.
Other jurisdictions, however, have addressed the matter. Most commonly, the
issue arises in cases of aggravated assault, where the aggravating factor is the use of a
deadly weapon. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (West 2004) ("person commits

The Legislature has not changed the term "use" in the aggravated robbery statute.
The current version, however, includes a broader definition of the term "dangerous
weapon." Under the current version, a "dangerous weapon" is "any item capable of
causing death or serious bodily injury" or "a facsimile or representation of the item"
where "the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim to reasonably
believe the item is likely to cause death or serious injury" or where "the actor represents
to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of such an item." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (West 2004).
3

Even if defendant's formulation of the issue were correct, the evidence would
still support a conviction. "A person's state of mind [or intent] is not always susceptible
of proof by direct and positive evidence, and, if not, may ordinarily be inferred from acts,
conduct, statements or circumstances." State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, \ 10, 988
P.2d 949 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, as shown more fully
below, defendant's acts, conduct, statements, and circumstances are sufficient to support
a jury verdict that defendant intended to use his car as a dangerous weapon.
10

aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in § 76-5-102 and he . . . uses a
dangerous weapon as defined in § 76-1-601"). While most courts hold that "an
automobile is not a dangerous or deadly weapon per se," it "appears to be well settled
that an automobile may be so used as to constitute a dangerous or deadly weapon."
Automobile as a Dangerous or Deadly Weapon within Meaning of Assault or Battery
Statute, 89 A.L.R.3d 1026 (2005 electronic update), at § 2[a]. An automobile is "a
deadly weapon within the meaning of an assault statute when it is used in a manner likely
to produce death or great bodily harm." Id.; see, e.g., Bogan v. State, 547 S.E.2d 326,
329 (Ga. App. 2001) (while automobile is not in and of itself a deadly weapon,
defendant's use of automobile may make it a deadly weapon); Fleming v. State, 987
S.W.2d 912, 919 (Tex. App. 1999) (evidence was sufficient to support finding that
defendant's vehicle was a "deadly weapon" as defendant's use of the vehicle "was
'capable' of causing death or serious bodily injury to [another]"); Luck v. Commissioner,
531 S.E.2d 41, 44 (Va. App. 2000) (motor vehicle, wrongfully used, can be a weapon as
deadly as a gun or knife).
Courts in other jurisdictions have also addressed the use of an automobile as a
dangerous weapon in aggravated robbery cases. In Ward v. State, 2002 WL 1724334
(Tex. App. 2002) (Addendum B), the issue was whether the evidence sufficed to support
a finding that that an automobile was used as a deadly weapon. Id. at *3-4. The Ward
victim left a Texas Sam's Club, walked to his Ford Explorer, put the key in the ignition,
started the engine, and rolled down the electric windows to cool the interior. Id. at * 1.
After returning his shopping car to the "cart corral," located about ten or fifteen feet way,
11

the victim saw Ward get into the Explorer and back it out of its parking space. Id. When
the victim "stood in front of the Explorer in an attempt to stop [Ward]," Ward "'floored
it' and drove quickly out of the parking lot." Id. "The victim moved out of the way of
the Explorer by putting his hands on the hood and jumping around to the side of the
vehicle," straining his hip. Id. At trial, Ward "admitted stealing the Explorer but denied
any intent to run over [the victim] or strike him with the vehicle. Instead, he asserted that
he was simply trying to flee the scene as quickly as possible." Id. While Ward claimed
that he did not see the victim, the victim asserted that Ward "maintained eye contact with
him throughout the incident." Id.
The appellate court affirmed Ward's conviction. The court reasoned that "[a]
deadly weapon is anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of
causing death or serious bodily injury." Id. at *4 (emphasis in original) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). "An instrument that is not a deadly weapon per se
may qualify as a deadly weapon by (1) the manner of its use or intended use, (2) the
instrument's size and shape, and (3) the instrument's capacity to produce death or serious
bodily injury." Id. (citations omitted). The court concluded that the State had presented
"ample evidence from which the jury could infer that the Explorer, in the manner of its
use, was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." Id. In particular, the
evidence supported a finding that Ward "saw [the victim] near the vehicle as he exited
the parking lot and accelerated[,] forcing [the victim] to jump out of the way." Id.
In State v. Hutchins, 1991 WL 154064 (Ohio App. 1991) (not reported in N.E.2d)
(attached as Addendum C), the issue again was whether the evidence sufficed to
12

establish that an automobile was a dangerous weapon and therefore to support a
conviction for aggravated robbery. Id. at *2. The incident involved Hutchins' taking a
car from a gas station. Id. at * 1. The owner, a mother, had left her son and her keys in
the car while she entered the station's convenience store. Id. From the store, she saw
Hutchins get into her car. Id. She ran out and managed to open the passenger door
before Hutchins could drive away. Id. She attempted to remove the child, but Hutchins
started the car. Id. She held on to the ridge at the top of the passenger door and
repeatedly asked Hutchins to give her the baby. Id. Hutchins continued driving,
dragging the mother about thirty feet. He then stopped suddenly, throwing the mother to
the ground. Id. Hutchins then backed the car over her legs, stopped, exited the car,
apologized, and fled. Id.
The court held that the facts sufficed to show that Hutchins had used the car as a
deadly weapon. Id. at *3. The court reasoned that the facts were sufficient to support a
verdict that Hutchins "used the automobile in a manner that was likely to inflict death or
great bodily harm." Id. Noting that u[t]he determination of whether the automobile was
used as a deadly weapon is a question of fact for the trier-of-fact," the court held that "the
known capability of an automobile to kill or maim and the manner in which [Hutchins]
employed that instrument" were sufficient bases for the jury's determination that
Hutchins had used the automobile as a deadly weapon for purposes of the aggravated
robbery statute. Id.
Here, the evidence sufficed to show that defendant used his car as a deadly
weapon. The State presented evidence that defendant saw Eric Cole standing directly in
13

front of defendant's car, that defendant nevertheless accelerated his car toward Eric, and
that defendant stopped and then hit the gas again. R143:53-55. Defendant's actions
forced Eric to either jump on the hood or be run over. Id. at 55-56. Once Eric was on the
hood, defendant did not stop, but accelerated out of the parking lot, drove about 50 feet,
and made a quick U-turn, throwing Eric off the car and causing him minor injuries. Id. at
56, 61, 74. This evidence sufficed to show that defendant used the car in a manner that
was capable of causing death or bodily injury. Had Eric not jumped on the car, defendant
would have hit him straight on. While Eric sustained only minor injuries, he could have
died or received major injuries, had he landed differently after defendant's quick U-turn
threw him from the hood. In sum, defendant used the car as a dangerous weapon, and
the jury properly returned a verdict for aggravated robbery.
The evidence also sufficed to show that defendant threatened to use his car as a
deadly weapon. "Threats may be communicated by action or conduct as well as words."
Ward, 2002 WL 1724334 at *3. The jury could have inferred from defendant's conduct
after he saw Eric Cole—his accelerating toward Eric, stopping, and then accelerating
again—that he was communicating a threat to run over Eric if Eric did not get out of the
way. Cf. id. (holding that jury could reasonably have determined that defendant
threatened the victim where defendant and victim had eye contact and where defendant
"suddenly accelerated toward [the victim.] forcing him to jump out of the way").

14

CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

76-1-601. Definitions.
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title:
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech.
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in a criminal action.
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission.
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means:
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and:
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim to reasonably believe the item is
likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; or
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of such an item.
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state.
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act and the actor is capable of acting.
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, government, partnership, or
unincorporated association.
(9) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise dominion or control over tangible
property.
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement,
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of
death.
(11) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to serious bodily injury, that creates
or causes protracted physical pain, temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ.
(12) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting, printing, electronic storage or
transmission, or any other method of recording information or fixing information in a form capable of being
preserved.
Amended by Chapter 205, 1996 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76_01029.ZIP 2,669 Bytes
Sections in this Chapter [Chapters in this Title) All Titles|Legislative Home Page
Last revised: Tuesday, December 21, 2004

UT ST § 76-6-301
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-301

UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE
CHAPTER 6. OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY
PART 3. ROBBERY
76-6-301 Robbery.
(1) A person commits robbery if:
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take personal
property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence,
against his will, by means of force or fear; or
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force
against another in the course of committing a theft.
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it occurs
in an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate flight
after the attempt or commission.
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-301, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, §
222, § 1.

76-6-301; 1995, ch.

NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Amendment Notes. --The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, rewrote Subsection
(1), which had read "Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of personal
property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence,
against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear," added Subsection (2),
and redesignated former Subsection (2) as (3).

©

2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of committing a robbery"
if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or
commission of a robbery.
Amended by Chapter 62, 2003 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76_07022.ZIP 1,968 Bytes
Sections in this Chapter)Chapters in this TitlelAU TitleslLegislative Home Page
Last revised: Tuesday, December 21, 2004

ADDENDUM B

Vtestlaw.
Page 1

Not Reported in S.W.3d
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
NOTICE:
NOT
DESIGNATED
FOR
PUBLICATION. UNDER TX R RAP RULE 47.7,
UNPUBLISHED
OPINIONS
HAVE
NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE BUT MAY BE CITED
WITH THE NOTATION "(not designated for
publication)."

Court of Appeals of Texas,
Austin.
Gregory Dywayne WARD, Appellant,
v.
The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 03-02-0G082-CR.
July 26, 2002.
Defendant was convicted in the 27th Judicial District
Court, Bell County, Gordon G. Adams, J., of
aggravated robbery and aggravated assault, and jury
made affirmative deadly weapon finding. Defendant
appealed. The Court of Appeals, David Purvear, J.,
held that: (1) evidence was sufficient to support
convictions, and (2) defendant used stolen vehicle as
deadly weapon.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
HI Automobiles €^>355(14)
48Ak355(14) Most Cited Cases
JH Robbery € ^ 2 4 . 5 0
342k24.50 Most Cited Cases
Evidence was factually sufficient to prove that
defendant intentionally or knowingly threatened or
placed victim in fear of imminent bodily injury or
death, which thus supported convictions for
aggravated robbery and aggravated assault; defendant
entered victim's vehicle in parking lot, and when
victim stood in front of vehicle in an attempt to stop
defendant, defendant "floored it" at victim and drove
away quickly, injuring victim's hip, and eyewitness
and defendant both stated they would have felt
threatened had they been in victim's position.
V T.C.A., Penal Code S $ 22.02(a)(2), 29.03(a)(2).
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121 Automobiles €^>355(14)
48Ak355(14) Most Cited Cases
121 Robbery €=>24.15(1)
342k24.15(l) Most Cited Cases
Sufficient evidence supported jury's affirmative
finding that stolen motor vehicle was used as "deadly
weapon," for purposes of aggravated assault and
aggravated robbery convictions; defendant entered
victim's vehicle, and when victim stood in front of
vehicle in an attempt to stop defendant, defendant
"floored it" at victim, resulting in injury to victim's
hip. V.T.C.A., Penal Code $ § 1.07(a)(17)(B),
22.02(a)(2), 29.03(a)(2).
From the District Court of Bell County, 27th Judicial
District, No. 50,938; Gordon G. Adams, Judge
Presiding.
Before Justices
PURYEAR.

KIDD,

PATTERSON

and

DAVID PURYEAR, Justice.
*1 A jury convicted appellant of aggravated robbery
and aggravated assault. See Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § §
29.03(a)(2); 22.02(a)(2) (West 1994). The jury made
an affirmative finding that the appellant used a
deadly w eapon in the course of committing the two
crimes. See Tex.Crim.Code Proc. Ann. art. 42.12,
3g(a)(2) (West Supp.2002); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. $
508.145(d) (West Supp.2002). The trial court
assessed punishment at forty years in prison and a
$10,000 fine. Appellant brings three points of error
challenging the factual sufficiency of the evidence to
support his convictions. We will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At approximately 6:30 p.m. on June 28, 1999, John
Watts left the Sam's Club in Temple, and walked to
his vehicle, a Ford Explorer. Watts put the key in the
ignition of his Explorer, started the engine, and rolled
down the electric windows in an effort to cool off the
interior of the vehicle. After he loaded his groceries
into the back of the Explorer, Watts returned his
shopping cart to the "cart corral" located
approximately ten to fifteen feet away from his
vehicle. As Watts returned to the. Explorer, he saw
appellant get into it and back it out of the parking
space. Watts then stood in front of the Explorer in an
attempt to stop appellant. Appellant then "floored it"
and drove quickly out of the parking lot. Watts
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moved out of the way of the Explorer by putting his
hands on the hood and jumping around to the side of
the vehicle. Watts strained his hip as a result. The
incident was estimated to have taken between five
and twenty seconds. Appellant was arrested
approximately two and a half weeks later on July 16,
1999.
At trial, appellant admitted stealing the Explorer but
denied any intent to run over Watts or strike him with
the vehicle. Instead, he asserted that he was simply
trying to flee the scene as quickly as possible.
Appellant stated further that he did not see Watts in
front of the Explorer because the incident occurred so
quickly. Watts asserted that appellant maintained eye
contact with him throughout the incident and that he
felt that if he had not moved out of the way, appellant
would have run him over. A witness at the scene
stated that he would have felt threatened in the
situation, and that there was no indication that the
driver of the Explorer had any intention of stopping
to avoid hitting Watts. In addition, a police officer
testified that a motor vehicle can be used as a deadly
weapon.
Appellant brings three points of error on appeal: (1)
the evidence is factually insufficient to support the
finding of guilt of the offense of aggravated
robbery with a deadly weapon, (2) the evidence is
factually insufficient to support the finding of guilt of
the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon, and (3) the evidence is insufficient to show
that the automobile was, in the manner and means of
its use, a deadly weapon.
DISCUSSION
The Factual Sufficiency Standard of Review
*2 In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the
evidence, we begin with the presumption that the
evidence supporting the judgment is legally
sufficient. Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129-30
(Tex.Crim.App.1996). The court reviews the
evidence presented to the jury both tending to prove
and disprove the elemental fact. Jones v. State, 944
S.W.2d 642. 647 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). The
reviewing court views all the evidence in a neutral
light, and sets aside the verdict "only if it is so
contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence
as to be clearly wrong and unjust." Clewis, 922
S.W.2d at 129; see also Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d
1, 7 (Tex.Crim.App.2QQ0).
The appellate court may disagree with the fact
finder's determination, but its review must employ
© 2005 ThomsonAVest. No
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appropriate deference to prevent substituting its
judgment for that of the fact finder. Johnson, 23
S.W.3d at 7. Further, the examination should not
substantially intrude on the fact finder's role as the
sole judge of the weight and credibility given to
witness testimony. Id. The degree of deference a
reviewing court provides must be proportionate with
the facts it can accurately glean from the trial record.
Id. at 8. Unless the record clearly demonstrates that a
different result is appropriate, an appellate court must
defer to the jury's determination concerning what
weight to give contradictory testimonial evidence
because resolution frequently hinges on an evaluation
of credibility and demeanor, and the jurors were in
attendance when the testimony was delivered. Id.
Moreover, it is not enough to support a finding of
factual insufficiency that an equally plausible
alternative to the jury's determination exists.
Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 285
(Tex.Crim.App.2001). The existence of some
evidence contrary to the outcome is acceptable. It is
only when the conviction ignores the great weight
and preponderance of contrary evidence that the
verdict should be set aside. Id.
The Intent Element
£11A party commits the offense of robbery if, in the
course of committing theft and with the intent to
obtain or maintain control of property, he
intentionally or knowingly threatens or places
another in fear of irnminent bodily injury or death.
See Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 29.02(a)(2) (West 1994).
If a person uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during
the commission of a robbery, the offense becomes an
aggravated robbery. Id. § 29.03(a)(2).
Assault occurs when a person intentionally or
knowingly threatens another with imminent bodily
injury. See Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(2) (West
Supp.2002). The offense becomes an aggravated
assault if it is committed using a deadly weapon. Id. §
22.02(a)(2) (West 1994).
The question raised by appellant in his first two
issues is whether the evidence offered by the State
was factually sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he intentionally or knowingly threatened
or placed Watts in fear of imminent bodily injury or
death. The resolution of this issue hinged on the
credibility of the testimony of the witnesses at trial,
including the appellant who testified in his own
behalf. Appellant testified that he did not intend to
threaten Watts, while Watts and an eyewitness
testified that they believed appellant knew of Watts's
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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presence in the parking lot and intended to accelerate
in his direction. On direct and redirect examination,
Watts testified as follows:
*3 Q: Did you happen to see where [appellant] was
looking as you were standing in front of the
vehicle, pointing your finger at him?
A: He was watching me closely. As he got in the
vehicle his eyes were on me.... And he got in and
he never took his eyes off me.
Q: How about when you were standing in front of
the vehicle?
A: He looked me right in the eye.

Q: Now as you stood in front of your vehicle and
pointed the finger at this individual making eye
contact with him, what happened next?
A: He pulled her down into drive and stood on it.
Q: What do you mean by "stood on it"?
A: He floored it.
***
Q: Do you believe this individual intended to hit
you with the vehicle?
A: Yes, I think he would have run over me if I
hadn't been able to get out of the way.
An eyewitness, Carlos Brooks, testified that he
would have felt threatened had he been in Watts's
position. When asked how fast the appellant drove
the Explorer towards Watts, Brooks replied that it
was fast enough that he would have gotten out of the
way. The appellant admitted that he jumped into
Watts's vehicle with the intent to steal it, but denied
any intent to use the Explorer as a weapon or to harm
Watts in any way. He asserted that he was not the
type of man who would harm another individual
intentionally, and said he was only trying to flee the
scene as quickly as possible. However, he admitted
he would have felt threatened under the same
circumstances.
Threats may be communicated by action or conduct
as well as words. McGowan v. State, 664 S.W.2d
355, 357 fTex.Crim.App.1984). A neutral review of
the evidence reveals that the jury could reasonably
find that appellant intentionally or knowingly
threatened Watts. Appellant admitted that he floored
the vehicle, that he saw Watts near the car as he
exited the parking lot, and that he would have felt
threatened under the same circumstances. This
coupled with testimony by the victim and the
eyewitness that appellant suddenly accelerated
toward Watts forcing him to jump out of the way and
that appellant maintained eye contact with Watts
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throughout the incident was sufficient to outweigh
the evidence to the contrary, which consisted solely
of appellant's testimony that he did not intend to
threaten Watts. At best, appellant offers only an
equally plausible alternative version of the facts that
the jury chose not to believe. Therefore, the verdict
was not so contrary to the overwhelming evidence as
to be unjust. We overrule appellant's first and second
points of error.
Motor Vehicle as Deadly Weapon
[2] In his third point of error, appellant contends that
the evidence adduced at trial was factually
insufficient to support the jury's affirmative finding
that he used the Explorer as a deadly weapon. [FN 11
Appellant claims he used the Explorer simply to
effect his escape and that he had no specific intent to
threaten, hurt, or kill Watts with the Explorer.
FN1. "Deadly weapon" means:
(A) a firearm or anything manifestly
designed, made, or adapted for the purpose
of inflicting death or serious bodily injury;
or
(B) anything that in the manner of its use or
intended use is capable of causing death or
serious bodily injury.
Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 1.07fa)q7) (West
1994).
*4 A deadly weapon is "anything that in the manner
of its use or intended use is capable of causing death
or serious bodily injury." Tex. Pen.Code Ann. §
L07fa)q7)fB) (West 1994) (emphasis added). An
instrument that is not a deadly weapon per se may
qualify as a deadly weapon by (1) the manner of its
use or intended use, (2) the instrument's size and
shape, and (3) the instrument's capacity to produce
death or serious bodily injury. Garza v. State, 695
S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985X affd, 725
S.W.2d 256 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). To establish use
of a deadly weapon, the State is not required to prove
the weapon used actually caused death or serious
bodily injury. See Brooks v. State, 900 S.W.2d 468,
472 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1995, no pet.). Rather, the
State must show the weapon was capable of causing
death or serious bodily injury. Id. at 472. At trial, the
police officer who arrested appellant, testified that in
her experience an automobile could be used as a
deadly weapon; thus, the State produced evidence
from which a jury could reasonably infer that the
Explorer was capable of causing death or serious
bodily injury. There was also ample evidence from
which the jury could infer that the Explorer, in the
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Not Reported in S.W.3d
2002 WL 1724334 (Tex.App.-Austin)
(Cite as: 2002 WL 1724334 (Tex.App.-Austin))
manner of its use, was capable of causing death or
serious b odily injury. Appellant saw W arts n ear the
vehicle as he exited the parking lot and accelerated
forcing Watts to jump out of the way.
The issue of whether a jury must find that a
defendant intended to use the motor vehicle
as a deadly weapon was addressed by the
court of criminal appeals in Walker v. State,
897 S.W.2d 812 (Tex.Crim.App.1995), in
which the court construed "deadly weapon"
as it appears in article 42.12, section
3g(a)(2) of the code of criminal procedure.
[FN2") In that case, the defendant argued
against the jury's affirmative finding that he
used his vehicle as a deadly weapon because
he
was
charged
with
involuntary
manslaughter resulting from his operation of
a motor vehicle while intoxicated, thus,
there was no evidence he operated his car
with intent to cause the decedent's death. In
addressing appellant's claim, the court of
criminal appeals relied on Patterson v. State,
769
S.W.2d
938.
940-941
(Tex.Crim. App. 1989),
concerning
the
meaning of "use":
FN2. Article 42.12, section 3g(a)(2) provides:
The provisions of Section 3 of this article do
not apply:

(2) to a defendant when it is shown that a
deadly weapon as defined in Section 1.07,
Penal Code, was used or exhibited during
the commission of a felony offense or
during immediate flight therefrom, and that
the defendant used or exhibited the deadly
weapon or was a party to the offense and
knew that a deadly weapon would be used or
exhibited.
Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann, art. 42.12, §
3gfaV2) (West 2002).
"Use" as a verb, may mean a number of things. For
example, "use" is defined as 'to put into action or
service: have recourse or enjoyment of: employ ...
to carry out a purpose or action by means of: make
instrumental to an end or process: apply to
advantage: turn to account: utilize'.... In explicating
the word the dictionary provides the following
synonym [sic] 'employ, utilize, apply, avail: use is
general and indicates putting to service of a thing,
usu. for an intended or fit purpose....'"
Id. Based on this analysis, the court reasoned that
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when there is no clear intent to harm or kill, the
meaning of "use" is open to the broadest possible
interpretation. Walker, 897 S.W.2d at 814. For
example, use of a deadly weapon during the
commission of a felony offense refers not only to the
actual wielding of a firearm but also extends to any
employment of a deadly weapon, including mere
possession, if such possession facilitates the
commission of the associated felony. Patterson, 769
S.W.2d at 941. Therefore, the Walker court held that
no intent to use the automobile as a deadly w eapon
was required; rather, "an object may be used as a
deadly weapon where the 'manner of its use ... is
capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.' "
Walker, 897 S.W.2d at 814 (quoting definition of
"deadly weapon" in section 1.07 of the penal code):
see also Tyra v. State, 897 S.W.2d 796, 798
(Tex.Crim. App. 1995). This Court expressed the same
view in Roberts v. State, 766 S.W.2d 578, 579
(Tex.App.-Austin 3 989. no pet). In that case, we
held that the reckless operation of a truck, with an
awareness of, but conscious disregard for, a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that injuries to
another would result, was enough to find the truck
was used as a deadly weapon. Id. Thus, we hold it
was not necessary for the jury to find that the
defendant intended to use the Explorer as a deadly
weapon. JTN3]
FN3. We note that in an earlier case
involving possession of a prohibited
weapon, the court of criminal appeals held
that in order for an object to qualify as a
deadly weapon for affirmative finding
purposes, the weapon must be utilized to
achieve an intended result, namely, the
commission of a felony offense. Narron v.
State,
835
S.W.2d
642,
644
(Tex.Crim.App. 1992). There was ample
evidence in this case that appellant used the
Explorer to commit a felony offense.
*5 The jury's determination that the Explorer was, in
the manner of its use, a deadly weapon is not against
the great weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we
hold that the evidence was factually sufficient to
support appellant's conviction. We overrule
appellant's third point of error.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled all appellant's points o f error, w e
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
2002 WL 1724334 (Tex.App.-Austin)
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CHECK OHIO SUPREME COURT RULES FOR
REPORTING OF OPINIONS AND WEIGHT OF
LEGAL AUTHORITY.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Sixth District, Lucas
County.
STATE of Ohio, Appellee,
v.
Thomas HUTCHINS, Appellant.
No. L 90-182.
Aug. 9,1991.
Anthony G. Pizza, Prosecuting Attorney and Joseph
J. Solomon, for appellee.
Fritz Byers, for appellant.
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
*1 This case is before the court on appeal from a
judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common
Pleas, Criminal Division.
Appellant, Thomas L.
Hutchins, was found guilty of one count of
aggravated robbery,
a violation
of R.C.
2911.0KA)fl), with a physical harm specification;
one count of unlawful restraint, a violation of R.C.
2905.03; and one count of negligent assault, a
violation of R.C. 2903.14. Appellant appeals his
convictions and sets forth the following assignments
of error:
"1. THE EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT TRIAL BY
THE STATE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE
DEFENDANT'S
CONVICTION
OF
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY.
"2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ENTERING
A
JUDGMENT
OF
CONVICTION
ON
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY AND UNLAWFUL
RESTRAINT WHICH, UNDER THE FACTS OF
THIS CASE, ARE ALLIED OFFENSES OF
SIMILAR IMPORT.
"3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING
THE CHARGE OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY TO
BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY UNDER THE
FACTS OF THIS CASE, BECAUSE THE STATE'S
THEORY
OF
GUILT
IMPERMISSIBLY
UNDERMINES
LEGISLATIVE
INTENT
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REGARDING
THE
CODIFICATION
CRIMINAL LAW IN OHIO."

OF

This case arises from the following pertinent facts.
On January 18, 1990, Loretta L. Sparks drove to the
Fuel Mart on Byrne Road in Toledo, Lucas County,
Ohio, to purchase a pack of cigarettes.
Loretta's
three month old son, Justin, was in a child restraint
seat and buckled into the front passenger seat of the
automobile.
Loretta pulled into the Fuel Mart at approximately
7:30 p.m. and parked close to the door of the gas
station/convenience mart with the passenger door of
her automobile parallel to and adjacent to the door of
the station. She left her son and her keys in the car.
Just after she purchased her cigarettes and was
turning to leave, the clerk, Dawn R. Jones, said,
"Your car." Loretta turned and saw a man getting
into her car. She ran out of the station and managed
to open the passenger door before the man could
drive away.
Sparks attempted to remove her child from the car
seat, but the man started the automobile.
Sparks
held on to the car by the ridge at the top of the
passenger door and repeatedly requested that she be
given her baby. Sparks was dragged, hanging on to
the side of the car, for approximately thirty feet. As
he approached Byrne Road, the driver suddenly
stopped the car. Sparks was thrown to the ground and
landed with her legs under the car behind the rear
wheel on the passenger side. The driver then backed
the rear tire over Sparks' legs and stopped. He exited
the automobile, came around to the passenger side,
apologized to Sparks, and fled on foot. Sparks was
admitted to the hospital for the injuries to her legs.
She and Jones subsequently identified appellant as
the person who was in the automobile on the evening
of January 18, 1990.
On January 30, 1990, the grand jury returned a three
count indictment charging appellant with aggravated
robbery, kidnapping, and felonious assault. All three
counts included a specification of physical harm.
Appellant never filed a motion to dismiss any of the
counts of the indictment or voiced any objection to
the fact that he was charged with aggravated robbery.
Appellant's defense was premised upon the
unreliability of eyewitness testimony and his alleged
alibi.
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*2 A jury trial was held on April 9, 1990. At that
trial, Loretta Sparks testified as to the facts set forth
above. Dawn Jones testified that she saw a man,
whom she identified as appellant, get into Sparks'
automobile. She further stated that appellant placed
his hand on Justin as he was entering the driver's side
of the car. Jones also described the same sequence
of events as testified by Sparks. Laurie Robinson
testified on behalf of appellant and stated that
appellant and some other friends were in her
apartment between 5:30 p.m. and approximately 9:00
p.m. on January 18, 1990.
The trial court instructed the jury as tor among other
things, the elements of kidnapping and the lesser
included offense of unlawful restraint; aggravated
robbery under R.C. 2911.0KA)q) and the lesser
included offense of grand theft of a motor vehicle;
felonious assault and the lesser included offense of
negligent assault;
and the physical harm
specifications.
Appellant's objections to these
instructions related to the wording of certain portions
of the instructions and to the fact that the trial court
rejected appellant's request for a charge on the lesser
included offense of petty theft.
The jury found appellant guilty of aggravated
robbery and the physical harm specification included
with this count and of the lesser included offenses of
unlawful restraint and negligent assault. Appellant
was sentenced on May 18, 1990. This timely appeal
followed.
In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts that
the jury verdict of guilty on the charged offense of
aggravated robbery was against the manifest weight
of the evidence.
As stated by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v.
Brown (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 305. at 313:
"In State v. Elev H978). 56 Ohio St.2d 169. at the
syllabus, this court held '[a] reviewing court will not
reverse a jury verdict where there is substantial
evidence upon which a jury could reasonably
conclude that all of the elements of an offense have
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt' Therefore,
in reviewing a claim that a jury verdict was against
the manifest weight of the evidence or that the
evidence was insufficient, a reviewing court's duty is
to review the record to determine whether there was
sufficient evidence for the jury to find defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
In the instant case, appellant could be convicted of
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aggravated robbery only if the prosecution offered
sufficient evidence to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that appellant, in committing or attempting a
theft offense as defined in R.C. 2913.PL or in fleeing
immediately thereafter, had a deadly weapon or
dangerous ordnance on or about his person or under
his control R.C. 2911.01fAVn.
Appellant alleges that insufficient evidence was
adduced to establish that the automobile was a deadly
weapon. In reaching this conclusion appellant first
points out that the finding of guilty on the charged
offense of aggravated robbery is inconsistent with the
jury's verdict on count three of the indictment,
felonious assault. The jury acquitted appellant of the
charged offense of felonious assault but found him
guilty of the lesser included offense of negligent
assault. Appellant asserts that by finding that his
actions with respect to the automobile were negligent
the jury indicated that appellant did not "knowingly"
use the automobile as a deadly weapon. Appellant
claims that if his actions with regard to the
automobile were not "knowing" or "intentional", the
automobile could not be deemed a deadly weapon.
In essence, appellant argues that in order for the jury
to conclude the automobile was a deadly weapon
they were required to first conclude that appellant
had the specific intent to inflict physical harm on
Loretta Sparks.
*3 R.C. 2923.11(A) defines a deadly weapon as:
" * * * any instrument, device, or thing capable of
inflicting death, and designed or specifically adapted
for use as a weapon, or possessed, carried, or used as
a weapon."
This definition is incorporated into several statutes
which set forth criminal offenses, for example, R.C.
2903.11. felonious assault; R.C. 2911.01. aggravated
robbery; R.C. 2911.11. aggravated burglary; R.C.
2903.14. negligent a ssault. Each of these o ffenses
consist of several elements, including intent. The
addition of the element of a "deadly weapon" does
not transform the requisite intent in each statute to
that of "knowingly" or "intentional." If appellant's
proposition were accepted an accused could not be
convicted of negligent assault unless it could be
demonstrated, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he or
she had "knowingly" or "intentionally" employed an
instrumentality to cause physical harm to another.
This contradicts the express language of R.C.
2903.14(A) which requires that the evidence need
only establish that negligence in the use of the deadly
weapon caused physical harm. We therefore reject
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any notion that the determination of an
instrumentality as being a deadly weapon must be
premised upon a finding that the instrument or device
was knowingly or intentionally employed to harm the
victim. Rather, we shall review the evidence offered
in light of the standard set forth below.

*4 Appellant, in his second assignment of error,
contends that aggravated robbery and unlawful
restraint are allied offenses of a similar import. He,
therefore, claims that, pursuant to R.C. 2941.25(A),
he could be charged with both offenses but convicted
of only one.

While some instruments or devices, e.g., a firearm,
are termed deadly weapons per se, others are not.
State v. Orlett (1975), 44 Ohio Misc. 7, 9. The test of
whether an instrumentality is a deadly weapon rests
upon its capability to inflict death or great bodily
harm. Id. The manner in which the instrument is
used and its nature determine its capability to inflict
death or great bodily harm. State v. Devoe (1977),
62 Ohio App.2d 194.
Therefore, it is wellestablished that in cases where an automobile is used
in a manner likely to produce great bodily harm or
death, an automobile can be determined to be a
deadly weapon. Orlett, supra, at 10; State v.
Allender (Dec. 5, 1990), Muskingham App. No. CA90-11, unreported; State v. Davidson (June 20,
1990), Lorain App. No. 89-CA-004641, unreported;
State v. Townsend (Feb. 22, 1990), Cuyahoga App.
No. 56571, unreported.
The determination of
whether the automobile was used as a deadly weapon
is a question of fact for the trier-of-fact. Orlett,
supra, at 9.

R.C. 2941.25 reads, in full:

The record of the present case reveals appellant was
fully aware of the fact that Loretta Sparks was
hanging onto the roof on the passenger side of the
automobile and imploring him to give her the baby.
Despite this fact, appellant moved the car forward for
approximately thirty feet and stopped suddenly,
thereby throwing Sparks to the ground. Although a
likelihood that Sparks would be near or under the
vehicle existed, appellant then put the automobile
into reverse and moved backwards mnning over
Sparks legs in the process. These are sufficient facts
upon which a jury could conclude that appellant used
the automobile in a manner that was likely to inflict
death or great bodily h arm. Any specific interit to
injure or kill did not have to be demonstrated. While
intent may be considered by a trier-of-fact as one
factor among many, see Orlett, supra, the known
capability of an automobile to kill or maim and the
manner in which appellant employed that instrument
are the bases for the jury's determination.
Accordingly, the jury could decide upon the evidence
offered that the automobile was a deadly weapon for
the purposes of both R.C. 2901.11(A)(1) and R.C.
2903.14.
Appellant's first assignment of error is
found not well-taken.
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"(A) Where the s ame c onduct by defendant c an b e
construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of
similar import, the indictment or information may
contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant
may be convicted of only one.
"(B) Where the defendant's conduct constitutes two
or more offenses of dissimilar import, or where his
conduct results in two or more offenses of the same
or similar kind committed separately or with a
separate animus as to each, the indictment or
information may contain counts for all such offenses,
and the defendant may be convicted of all of them."
In d etermining whether a n a ccused i s c harged with
allied offenses of similar import a court must apply a
two-tiered test. State v. Blankenship (1988), 38 Ohio
St.3d 116, 117. First, the court must compare the
two crimes. If the elements of the crimes correspond
to such a degree that the commission of one crime
will result in the commission of the other, the crimes
are allied offenses of similar import. Id. The second
step involves a review of the defendant's conduct. If
the court can conclude that the crimes were
committed separately or that a separate animus
existed for each crime, the defendant may be
convicted of both offenses. Id.
In State v. Logan (1979). 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 131, the
Supreme Court of Ohio noted that the crime of
robbery, by its very n ature, involves restraint of the
victim. Therefore, in following Logan, supra, the
Montgomery Court of Appeals found kidnapping and
robbery to be allied offenses of similar import. State
v Parker (1986), 31 Ohio App.3d 128, 130.
Unlawful restraint is a lesser included offense of
kidnapping. Committee Comments to HB-511, Ohio
Rev.Code Ann. $ 2905.03 (Page 1987). Thus, we
shall assume for the purposes of our discussion that
unlawful restraint and aggravated robbery can be
allied offenses of a similar import.
Appellant assumes that both of the offenses charged
were motivated by a single purpose and rely upon
identical conduct and the same evidence. See State
v. Donald (1979), 57 Ohio St.2d 73, 75. If such
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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were true, appellant could not be convicted of both
charged offenses. Id. Nevertheless, we conclude that
the charges are founded upon separate conduct
provable by different evidence and, therefore, have
separate animi, purpose or immediate motive. The
evidence supporting the conviction for aggravated
robbery consists of appellant's conduct toward
Loretta Sparks in that he attempted to deprive her of
the ownership of her automobile and in doing so fled
and used that automobile as a deadly weapon. The
evidence supporting the unlawful restraint conviction
consisted of appellant's conduct toward Justin Sparks
in that he placed his hand on the child and did not
allow the child's removal from the automobile.
Thus, we have separate forms of conduct towards two
different victims based upon separate evidence.
Accordingly, the charged offenses were committed
separately with a separate animus for each.
Consequently, under the circumstances of this case,
appellant could be convicted of both aggravated
robbery and unlawful restraint. Appellant's second
assignment of error is found not well-taken.

Page 4

appellant was not prejudiced or prevented from
having a fair trial, and the judgment of the Lucas
County Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division,
is affirmed.
Costs of this appeal assessed to
appellant.
HANDWORK, P.J., and MELVIN L. RESNICK and
SHERCK, JJ., concur.
1991 WL 154064 (Ohio App. 6 Dist.)
END OF DOCUMENT

*5 In his third assignment of error, appellant
maintains that the trial court erred in submitting the
charge of aggravated robbery to the jury because
permitting the state to indict and convict him of that
offense violates the constitutional principle of
separation of powers. Appellant also asserts that
allowing the charge and conviction for aggravated
robbery to stand effectively repeals a portion of R.C.
2913.02, automobile theft, a felony of a third degree,
because it permits the state to charge all persons who
are accused of the theft of an automobile and flee in
that automobile to be charged with aggravated
robbery.
This issue was never raised in the court below.
Errors which are neither raised nor reached by the
lower court will not be passed upon by an appellate
court. State v. Geraldo (1983), 13 Ohio App.3d 27.
28 (citations omitted). The doctrine of waiver of
error also applies to any constitutional issue. State v.
Awan (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 124. Hence, this
court need not address the issues in appellant's third
assignment of error. We note, however, that under
the narrow facts of the case at bar, the charge and
conviction for aggravated robbery did not constitute
judicial legislation or violate the legislature's intent in
enacting two separate statutes for the offenses of
aggravated
robbery
and
automobile
theft.
Appellant's third assignment of error is found not
well-taken.
On consideration whereof, this court finds that
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